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Abstract~____________________________________________________ 
We characterize the dynamic equilibrium path ofa competitive industry with free entry 
and exit, where atomistic fmns undertake investment over time in order to reduce their future 
production costs. Investment reduces both total as well as marginal cost of production; 
however, the associated dynamic scale economies are eventually bounded. Cost reduction is 
deterministic and there are no inter-firm spill-overs. Marginal cost in any time period is 
stricdy increasing in output and active firms incur a positive fixed cost even if no output is 
produced. The industry equilibrium path is socially optimal. Equilibrium prices are (weakly) 
decreasing over time. Firms invest in cost reduction and eam negative net profit when they 
are young. In later periods, they face prices aboye their mínimum average cost, produce 
beyond their mínimum efficient scale and eam strictly positive net profit. No frrm enters after 
the initial time periodo Though all fmns are ex ante identical, sorne fmns may exit before 
others (shake-out). Exiting fmns have relatively "small size" compared to incumbents; as the 
industry matures, concentration and the average size of incumbent fmns increase. 
Heterogeneity in behaviour and size of fmns emerges endogenously through differences in 
their length of stay in the industry. 
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llntmduction. 
One ofthe most impoItant factors behind inteItem¡x>ra1 variations in market structure, as vveH 
as prices, output and profitability offmns in an industry, is productivity and technology improvements 
occumng at frrm-Ievel. Activities such as research and development (R&D) and innovation which lead 
to the emergence and adoption of new technologies are crucial factors behind such changes. These 
activities are potentially beneficial to all fmns and even ifdirect "free-riding" is prevented by patents, 
there are widespread indirect spill-over effects. There is, hovvever, another class of activities which 
includes frrm-specific learningl , organizational innovation, and other (frrm-specific) efficiency 
enhancing activities which also playa significant role in productivity improvement and cost reduction 
by fmns. Their cornmon feature is frrm-specificity - they are determined almost entirely through 
internal investment and accumulation ofexperience within the frrm with little, ifany, potential benefit 
to other fmns. This paper focuses on the latter class of activities and analyzes the incentives for cost 
reduction offered by a competitive market as vveH as their consequences on the dynamics of industry 
structure and market variables. In particular, vve characterize the dynamic equilibrium path of a 
competitíve industrywith a continuum ofprice-taking fmns, free entryand exit, where individual fmns 
undertake investment over time in order to reduce their future production cost2• 
In this paper, vve consíder productíon technologies which exhibít decreasing returns; in each 
time period, the current marginal cost ofproduction is strictly increasing in outpuf. This allows price­
lThe applied literature on the "Ieaming cUlVe" in industries identifies a complex set of factors behind cost 
reduction in fmns a lot ofwhich can be cJubbed under "indirect" labour leaming, that is, improvement in labour 
productivity arising from conscious management effort. Improvernents in "architectural aspects" of modem 
manufacturing organizations such as inventory and communication systerns, interdepartmental coordination, 
degree ofjob specialization and task rotation, decentralization ofresponsibilities, process quality control, methods 
ofmotivating and training workers etc. require investment and experience. See, MookheIjee and Ray (1992) for 
further details. 
2Acomparable two period model ofa competitive industry with atornistic fmns who engage in "leaming 
by doingtl is anaIyzed by Petrakis, Rasmusen and Roy (1994); in that model, future production cost is a 
decreasing function of cumulative past output rather than direct investment. As a result, fmns overproduce 
(relative to what is suggested by current price and marginal cost cUlVe) in order to reduce future cost. Numerous 
empirical studies have pointed out that cumulative investrnent (as considered in the present paper) is a better 
explanatory variable for frrm performance compared to cumulative output (see Dutton and Thomas (1984». 
Dynamic non-cooperative games where fmns rnake cost reducing investrnents of similar kind have been 
analyzed, among others, by F1aherty (1980), Spence (1984) and Ericson and Pakes (1995). 
3If the firm-specific technology exhibits constant retums at each point of time, then the dynamic scale 
econornies associated with the possibility of unít cost reduction through investrnent, leads to a breakdown of 
perfect competition. The market cannot compensate an individual frrm for past investment because whenever 
price is greater than the current marginal cost, price-taking fmns produce indefmitely large output Our 
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taking fmns to eam strictly positive profit as compensation for past investment Vvithout violating 
market equilibritun. Individual fmns, by making investments, are able to reduce their total as well 
marginal cost of production over time in a detenninistic way. A fmn incurs a strictly positive "ftxed 
cost" every period it stays in the industry, even ifno output is produced Thus, the average cost curve 
of a fmn in any time period is U-shaped. The fixed cost can be also reduced by investment. If the 
cost-reduction technology is such that the dynamic retums to scale for an individual fmn are bounded, 
competitive industry equilibrium exists. As there are no externalities or inter-fmn spill-overs, the 
equilibrium path is socially optimal. The competitive market provides just the right incentives for 
investment in cost reduction.4 
Firms Vvith perfect foresight, take the price path as given and rnake their entry, exit, output and 
investment decisions over time, so as to maximize their intertemporal profit (net of investment cost). 
In equilibrium, each fmn that enters the industry eams exactly zero intertemporal profit over its period 
ofstay, no fmn can eam strictly positive intertemporal profit by changing its entry and exit decisions. 
Firms Which stay for more than one period undertake strictly positive investment in cost reduction. 
Equilibrium prices are (weakly) decreasing over time and líe below the static competitive price Le., 
the minimum average cost for a newentrant. Firms undertake investment and eam negative net profits 
in their earlier periods ofstay, Which is compensated by positive future profits; price is greater than 
the mínimum average cost of mature fmns. Firms typica1ly produce aboye their mínimum efficient 
sca1e in later periods of stay. 
Recent empírical studies indicate that a distinctive characteristic of industry evolution is the 
high degree ofheterogeneity encountered: high variance ofgrowth rates across fmns, high dispersion 
in size and significant rates of tumovers of fmns5• Since the early eighties, models of stochastic 
evolution and selection in competitive industries have been used to explain these empírica1 
assumption ofdecreasing retums technology at each point of time reflects the faet that organizational capital and 
structure of knowledge are fixed for a fmn during its production decision in any period. 
4 Competitive equilibrium theOly ofindustry dynamics with atomistic fmns was ftrSt developed by Lucas 
and Prescott (1971). Hopenhayn (1990) establishes results on existence and social optimality ofdynamic indust:ty 
equilibrium with entry and exit, for a vety general class of intertemporal technology and stochastic shocks, both 
aggregate and fmn specific. 
.5 For example, Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989) study a sample ofU.S. manufaeturing industries 
over a period of5 years and report rates ofentry ranging from 30.7% to 42.7% and an equally dramatic exit rate 
ranging from 30.8% to 3s)oIo across industries. 
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regularities. Jovanovic (1982) analyzes the dynamics of a competitive industry where atomistic fmns, 
mcertain a1x>ut their productivity, acquire noisy infonnation a1x>ut howefficient theyare; incumbents 
that are aftlicted by lIDfavourable signals conc1ude they are inefficient and exit the market to be 
replaced by new entrants. Pakes and Ericson (1990) discuss the implications ofa more general version 
of this model and compare it with those of a stochastic model of their own where fmns actively 
mdertake investment in order to influence the conditional distribution of future shocks. In a fairly 
general model with fmn level exogenous technology shocks, Hopenhayn (1992 a&b) shows the 
possibility of entry and exit as part of the limiting behaviour of an industry. In a similar model, 
Hopenhayn (1993) relates the observed patterns ofentry and exit to stochastic demand expansion and 
technologica1 change. Jovanovic and !vfacDonald (1994) discuss a competitive model where 
innovational opportunities fuel entry and failure to innovate, whose chances are exogenously specified, 
fuels exit. The unifying feature ofthis c1ass ofmodels is the role of fmn-levelmcertainty in creating 
heterogeneity among fmns. The process of market selection then leads to exit of fmns affiicted by 
unfavourable shocks, ofien opening up room for entrants with more favourable initial characteristics 
(who are therefore more optimistic a1x>ut future profitability than fmns that exitl. In contrast, our 
model is fully deterministic. The dynamics ofthe industry are determined exc1usively by deterministic 
shifts in the cost structure of fmns resulting from deliberate investrnent mder perfect foresight. 
Further, all fmns are ex ante identica1 and market demand is stationary over time. Even so, our model 
explains many of the stylized empirical observations relating to industry dynamics. 
We show that on the industry equilibrium path, sorne fmns may exit the market before others. 
This shdce-out of fmns is not a result ofpredatory behaviour (even though it is typicallyassociated 
with expansion ofthe size ofincumbent fmns through investrnent); nor does it result from fmns being 
subject to lIDfavourable shocks. The reason behind shake-out in our model is that investment in cost 
reduction may lead to an expansion of fmns' optimal scale. Given that market demand is stationary, 
the industry may no longer be able to sustain all the existing fmns without excessive price reductions 
which can harm the incentives to invest. Thus, it is in order to give appropriate incentives for cost 
reductions that the market requires some fmns to exit. The role of exiting fmns, from the point of 
social efficiency, is to reduce the industry-wide cost ofproduction in initial periods when the marginal 
6 In a somewhat different exercise, Lambson (1991) analyzes a dynamic competitive model where flrrns 
make investments which entail sunk cost and whose relative profltability is influenced byexogenous stochastic 
shocks over time; the equilibrium path can exhibit high turnover of plants. See, also, Dixit (1989). 
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cost curve could be very steep. We establish a simple sufficient conclition for shake-out which is 
satisfied if the nñnimmn efficient sca1e expands fast enough with cost-reducing investment and the 
market dernand is relatively inelastic. We construct an example where exit occurs in every periodo On 
the other hand, if investment reduces only the fixed cost, the fmn supply curve stays unchanged over 
time and therefore, shake-out does not OCClU". 
Shake-out is a widely observed empirical phenornenon. In a study of the evolution of46 new 
products, Gort and Klepper (1982) frnd an average rate of shake-out of fmns - measured by the 
number of fmns after the decrease, relative to the peak, - of roughly 40010. The rate ofexit is higher 
among relatively smaller fmns and the average size of incmnbent fmns in the industry increases with 
maturity (see, among others, Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989), Davis and Haltiwanger (1992». 
In 0lU" model, exiting fmns make typically less cmnulative investment than staying fmns. Thus, the 
supply curve of fmns which stay on in the industry is to the right of that of exiting fmns. Exiting 
fmns are smaller in size. 
No entry OCClU"S in the industry after period 1; this apparent barrier to entry co-exists with 
mature incmnbents earning positive net profits. This too is not due to any anti-competitive activity of 
incmnbent fmns, but is part of the socialIy efficient competitive outcome. The absence of late entry 
is intuitive as there is no randomness governing the fortunes offmns, nor does market dernand change 
over time. AH fmns which enter the industry initially rea1ize their planned rettrrn from cmrent 
investment in tenns of futtrre profitability with certainty. The supply curves of incmnbent fmns shift 
out over time, leaving no scope for late entry. As there is no late entry and exiting fmns have typicalIy 
lower cumulative investment compared to fmns that stay on, concentration as well the size of 
incmnbent fmns increase as the industry mattrres. Even though fmns are ex ante identical, 
heterogeneity emerges in the output, investment, production costs as well as profit ofactive fmns in 
any time periad, because ofclifferences in their length of stay in the industry. 
We also illustrate sorne other interestingpossibilities through numerical examples. An increase 
in opportunities for cost reduction may lead to a decline in industry concentration; investment as a 
proportion of revenue may increase as industry concentration decreases; an increase in dernand 
elasticity may lead to an increase in industry concentration. These contrast sharply with standard 
"Schumpeterian" notions as well as results obtained in oligopolistic models ofR&D (see, Dasgupta 
(1986), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980». 
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Section JI describes the model fonnally and states the defmitions as well as basic results 
related 10 the existence ofdynamic industry equilibrium and its social optimality. The main results of 
the paper relating 10 characterization ofthe equilibrium path in terms ofprices, output, entry and exit 
offrrms are contained in Section m. Section IV discusses the phenomenon ofexit or shake-out in our 
model and establishes a sufficient condition for exit. Section V contains sorne numerica1 examples 
which highlight certain interesting features that may be observed in industry equilibrium. Section VI 
condudes. Sorne of the proofs are contained in the appendix. 
n The :Model and Preliminruy Results 
Consider a homogenous good industry which lasts for T periods, 1 < T < 00. The market 
demand in period 1 depends only on the current price and is stationary over time. Denote by D(p) the 
market demand function and by P(Q), the inverse demand function. There is a continutUIl of ex ante 
identical frrms (of indefmitely large measure) which can enter the industry in any periodo Each fmn 
is of measure zero and is indexed by i E R. In each period t, an active fmn i produces output <!l(i) 
~O and makes an investrnent x¡(i) ~ O. Let z¡(i) E R be the cumulative investment of fmn i at the 
beginning of period t. The latter summarizes fmn i's stock of fmn-specific learning, organizational 
capital and other efficiency enhancing attributes which we may collectively refer to as its stock 01 
knowledge in period t. The initial stock of knowledge for an entering fmn is normalized to be equal 
10 zero. If fmn i enters in period T, then for t > T 
z¡(i) = ~(i) + ~+¡(i) + ....+ x¡.¡(i), z¡(i) := O, 
We shall use the letters q, x and z without time or fmn specific indices to indicate respectively the 
current output, current (flow) investment and the stock ofknowledge of a generic fmn. 
A fmn's production cost in any period depends on its current output as well as its stock of 
knowledge. Specifically, fmn ¡'s cost ofproducing output q in period t is given by C(q,z¡(i». On the 
other hand, fmn i's cost of making investment x¡(i) in any period t is given bY'YCx¡(i». Given prices 
(p¡,...Pr), a fmn i which enters in period T~ 1 and exits in period T+k ::;; T, earns intertemporal payoff 
equal 10 total discounted sum of profit, net of investment cost, that is, 
4....t+k8·T[pI<lt(i) - C(<lt(i),z¡(i» - 'YCx¡(i»l, 
\\here Ois the discount factor lying in (0,1l. We follow the convention of discounting profit streams 
10 the period ofentry. The fmn is free to decide its period ofentry and exit. Once a fmn exits, it loses 
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all its acquired technologica1 knowledge (embedded in its employed factors) and can re-enter the 
industry only as a fresh entrant with z = O. As there is an indefmitely large measure of identica1 
jX)tential entrants, we assume without loss of generality that a fmn which exits does not re-enter. 
We make the following assumptions on the inverse demand function P(Q) and the cost 
functions C(q,z), y(x): 
(Al) P:R.. ~R.. is continuous, strictly decreasing and integrable on any bounded intervalo 
(A2) C:R\ ~R.. is continuously differentiable; for any given z ;;::: 0, Cq(q,z) is strictly increasing in q 
on R..; C(O,z) > °for all z ;;::: O. 
(A3) Cz(q,z) ~ O; For any q;;::: 0, Zl > i implies that Cq(q,ZI) :s; Cq(q,i). 
(A4) There exists h > °such that Cq(O,z) ¿ h for all z ¿ O. 
(AS) y.R.. ~R.. is continuously differentiable, '}'(O) :;: 0, 1 (x) > °for x >O. 
(A6) For any q > 0, 1(0) + OCiq,O) < O. 
Let Pm(O) denote the current minimum average cost for a new entrant with zero stock of knowledge: 
Pm(O) = min{C(q,O)/q: q ;;::: O} 
(A7) 1~(Q) > Pm(O). 

For any vector ofoutputs (ql'.....qT) ¿O, let G(ql'<h'....qT) denote the minimum cost ofproduction afier 

taking into account the investment in cost reduction: 

G(q¡,<h'····qT) :;: 	 Min [41,..~-·[C('lt,zJ + '}'(xJ] 

~ ¿ 0, t = 1,...T 

z¡ = Lr= 1,....,1-1 Xp t >1, z. :;: O. 

It can be checked that there exists a solution to the minimization problem One can think of Gas the 
"net" cost ofproducing an output vector. Our next assumption imposes a restriction on the behaviour 
of the net cost function for large output levels: 
(AS) There exists K> 0, such that for any (q.,<h'....qT) ¿ 0, qt > K implies 
G(q" ..'1,..qT) > G(4.,·ét,··4T) + &-1 (qt - K)Pm(O) 
\\here éL = '1 for t =t= 't, 4, :;: K 
Assumption (Al) states that the market dernand function in any perlod depends only on the 
current price, is stationary over time and is strictly decreasing. Further, it is integrable on any bounded 
interval so that the net social surplus is well defmed. Assumption (A2) says that the cost function is 
smooth and that the marginal cost ofproduction is strictly increasing in output, no matter what the 
stock of knowledge is for the fmn. Thus the current production technology in any period exhibits 
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decreasing returns to sca1e. Further, production cost for an active fmn is strictly positive even if 110 
output is prod:uced, no matter how large the fmn's ctunulative investment. This can be interpreted as 
a "fixed" cost that must be paid by the fmn every perlod it stays in the industry. It can be reduced by 
investing, for instance, in organizational capital. Among other things, assumption (A2) implies that, 
in any time periad, the current average cost cmve is U-shaped and the current minirntun efficient scale 
of an active fmn is alvvays bounded avvay from zero. This ensures that only a fmite measure offmns 
enter the industry in equilibrlum. In the absence of this assumption and given a do'M1wards sloping 
demand cmve, it is possible that equilibrltun involves indefmitely large ntunber of fmns in the 
industry, each producing infmitesimal output in each perlad 
Assumption (A3) states that the total as well as the marginal costs ofproduction are (weakly) 
decreasing in the amount ofacctunulated investment. Note that we do not asstune that e is convex in 
both arguments. Thus, the marginal retum to investment in cost reduction may be initially increasing 
in the level of investment made by the frrm. Assumption (A4) says that the marginal cost of 
production for any fmn is uniformly bounded below by h > O. The latter ensures that the equilibritun 
prlces are bounded avvay from zero so that the size ofthe industry in any perlod has a uniform upper 
bound This enables us to ensure existence ofequilibrlum. Asstunption (AS) descrlbes the properties 
of the cost of investment in any periodo The marginal cost of making positive investment is strictly 
positive. Typically, one would expect the function y(x) would be convex though we do not make this 
assumption. Assumption (A6) ensures that the cost reduction technology is sufficiently "productive"; 
for a fmn which has made no past investment and plans to produce a strictly positive output next 
perlad, the discounted marginal retum from investing adollar in cost reduction is strictlypositive. This 
ensures that all fmns except those which stay for only one perlad, fmd it worthwhile to make strictly 
positive investment in their initial perlod ofstay. Assumption (A7) is a restriction which is necessary 
to ensure that the market is non-trivial and market equilibrltun exists when T = 1. 
The crucial assumption in the model is (A8); it limits the dynamic scale economies implied 
by the possibility of cost reduction. It ensures that the fmn's technology exhibits "asymptotic 
decreasing returns" even after taking into account the possibility ofcost reduction through investment. 
More particularly, as we allow for free entry and exit, equilibrltun prices are bounded aboye by Pm(O), 
the minimtun average cost of a new entrant. Assumption (A8) states that, if we restrict attention to 
prlce vectors which He in [O,PmY, no fmn will produce output in excess ofbound K; the net marginal 
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cost (taking into accOlmt investment cost) exceeds Pm(O) ifOutput exceeds K From the standpoint of 
social efficiency, instead of having one fmn produce q, > ~ it is better to reduce its output to K and 
have the excess, viz. (q, - K) produced by a measure of fresh entrants which stay in the market for 
one period and produce at their mínimum efficient sca1e. Note that this assurnption allows for 
environments where the current marginal cost of production Cq( q,z) falls to zero as z becomes very 
large, provided the marginal cost of investment, y (x), increases sharply enough so that the overall 
effect is to restrict fmn size and prevent any natural monopoly outcome7• However, even when the 
marginal cost of investment is constant, (A8) is satisfied ifthe infimum ofthe set ofpossible marginal 
production cost that a fmn can attain through investment exceeds Pm(O), when its output exceeds K8• 
Let I(i) and 't(i) denote, respectively, the periods of entry and exit for fmn i, 1 ~ I(i) ::; 't(i) 
~T. If fmn i never enters, we simply use the convention that I(i) = 't(i) = T+1. Given time periods 
:t and 1:, where 1 ~:t ~ 1: ~T, let S(I.1:) be the set of fmns which enter in period :t and exit in period 
1:. Further, let n(l'.1:) denote. the (Lebesgue) measure of the set S(l'.1:), that is the "mnnber 01finns" 
which enter in period:t and exit in 1:. Given price vector p = (P1""'Pr) and time periods lo 1: where 1 
~:t ~ 1: ::; T, we denote by O:p'l'.1:) the maximum discOlmted sum of profit (net of investment cost) 
that a fmn which enters in period I and exits in period 1: can achieve. Thus: 
1: 
O:P,l'.1:) = max La·! {Pt(]¡ - C(qt,z,) - y(xJ} (1) 
t=.I 
with respect to «(]¡,xJ ~ O, t = :t...1: 
t-1 

where z¡ = ~ t > I.. 2! = O. 

t=:I 
Let 'itP.I.1:) be the set of solutions to the maximization problem on the right hand side of (1). As 
C(q,z) is not necessarily convex, there can be multiple solutions to the profit maximization problem 
Let St denote the set of all fmns which are active in period t = 1,2,...T. Obviously, St is the 
uruon of all sets S(l'.1:) where :t ~ t ~ 1:. We are now ready to defme industry equilibrium: 
27For exarnple, C(q,z) =eq·kl: + F, with F, k> Oand '}'(x) =ax , a> O, 
SUtis is satisfied by cost functions in the family C(q,z) =G(q)H(z)+F where F> O, G is strictly convex and 
strictly increasing, H is decreasing in z and 1ÍIl\:...JI(z) > O; for instance, C(q,z) =q2(1 + e'Z) + F. 
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DefinitiOD of :ln<lmtry Equilibrimn: An industry equilibrium eonsists of: 
(i) measurable sets S(l'.'t) of fmns whieh enter in period .1 and exit in period 't, 1 ::; 1 ::; 't ::; T. 
(H) output and investment profile {(q(i),xli) ),t = l...,'t} for all i E S(I.'t), 1 ::; 1 ::; 't ::; T; q(i), x¡(i) 
integrable on S(1.'t). 
(iii) price vector p =(p\,....Pr) 
sueh that: 
(a) D(pJ = Q, where Qt = Íh(i)di 
St 
and, for all (.1'.'t) sueh that 1 ::;.1::; 't ::; T 
(b) ifn(l'.'t) > 0, then for all i E S(1.'t), {(q¡{i),x¡(i»,t = l'...,'t} E 'ftP,1'.'t) 
(e) n:p,I.'t) =0, if n(l'.'t) > 0, 
::;; 0, otherwise. 
Condition (a) says that the market should clear every period. Condition (b) says that, given the 
equilibrium price vector p, the output-investment profile of eaeh active fmn over its period of stay 
should maximize its net diseounted sum of profits. Condition (e) ensures that all active fmns, no 
matter when they enter and exit the industry, earn exaetly zero net intertemporal profit over their 
periods ofstay. In addition, there is no incentive for further entry and no active fmn can make a striet 
gain by ehanging its entry-exit decision. 
Under assumptions (AI)-(A8), there exists an industry equilibrium The faet that there is a 
eontinuum of fmns makes the aggregate teehnology for the industry a closed eonvex eone. Our 
assumptions limit the size of individual fmns as well as the industry. It can be shown that the set of 
equilibrium allocations are equivalent to those whieh solve the social planner's problem ofmaximizing 
the discounted sum ofnet social surplus in the industry. Ensuring existenee ofsolution to the planner's 
problem guarantees existence of an industry equilibrillIlf. This also proves that the industry 
equilibrium is socially optimal. In faet, the equilibrium is unique in prices and total output produced. 
At this stage, we should defme precisely the social planner's problern The social planner 
chooses: 
~is result follows from a more general result in Hopenhayn (1990) where the approach is to show that 
any solution to the social planners problem is equivalent to the equilibrium allocation when there is a single 
price-taking fmn in the industry which is endowed with the aggregate technology; the latter is then shown to be 
equivalent to an industly equilibrium. 
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(i) sets Sú.'t), 1 s I S 't S T, of fmns that enter in period I and exit in period 't (which also defmes 
the sets S. of fmns which are active in period t); 
(ii) output and investment profile {(<1(i),~(i»,t = ~ ..,'t} for all i E S(~'t), 1 SIS't S T; <1(i),~(i) ;?: 
Oand integrable on S(~'t). 
so as to maximize 
T (~ 1 

L 8'\ ~ Jp(y)dy - iC(<1(i),2¡(i» +y(~(i»]di } 

t=1 lO SI J 

subject to: 
Q = .lt(i)di 

St 

t-l 

z¡(i) = L Xc<i), t > ~ 21(i) = O. 

't=I 

Proposiúon 1. There exists an industry equilibrium. The allocation perlaining lo an industry 
equilibrium always solves lhe social planner's problem (SPP) and every solulion lo SPP can be 
suslained as an induslry equilibrium (wilh appropriately defined prices). 
The appendix contains an outline of the proof of Proposition 1. 
For fmn i E S(~'t), 1 S I S 1: S T, the equilibrium path of output, investment and stock of 
knowledge ((<1(i), ~(i), z¡(i», t =~..,'t} satisfies the following flIst order conditions: 
PI = Cq(<1(i), z¡(i», if <1(i) > O, (2) 
't 
Y(~(i» + L &-1 Ciq,(i), zii» = 0, if ~(i) > O (3) 
t=t+l 
(2) simply says that a fmn will equate price to its current marginal cost every period it produces 
positive output; in each period, the marginal cost curve of the fmn is its individual supply curve. As 
the stock of knowledge increases over time, the supply curve shifts to the right. 1t is easy to see that 
a fmn will produce <1(i) > O if and only if PI > Cq(O,2¡(i». (3) says that a fmn will undertake 
investment up to the point at which the current marginal cost of investment is equal to the discounted 
sum of futtn-e marginal retums on such investment i.e., the discounted sum of marginal decrease in 
futtn-e costs of production at the planned output leve1s. 1t is easy to check that x.(i) = Oif 't = 't (no 
fmn invests in its last period in the market). 
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Given a prlce vector p, the profit maximization problem (1) for fmn i need not have a uruque 
solution as we have not assumed C(q,z) to be convexo However, as Cq(.,z) is strict1y increasing for any 
Z, there is a uruque optimal output path associated with any vector of investment decisions over time. 
AH fmns start with the same supply curve in their perlod of entry, Le. the marginal cost curve 
corres¡xmding to z = O. Over time fmns may follow different investment paths and therefore exhibit 
heterogeneity in supply decisions. Heterogeneity in output decisions may occur in our model even if 
C and y are strict1y convex in both arguments (and thus, there is a uruque solution to the 
maximization problem in (1)). Identical fmns may follow different investment-output paths because 
their planned lengths of stay in the industry differ. 
Observe that, a firm might choose to stay in the industry and incur the fixed cost rather tban 
exit, if it expects to make sufficient profit in the future. Exiting would make the fmn lose its 
accumulated knowledge. Lastly, note that in period 1, all fmns have marginal cost curve Cq(q,O) so 
that the price PI > Cq(O,O), as otherwise no output would be produced. For the same reason, in later 
perlods, Pt > h where h > °is the 100ver bound on marginal cost in any perlod given by assumption 
(A4). 
III. Properties of Industry Equilibrium Path. 
In this section, we establish a set of interesting properties which characterize the equilibrium 
path of the industry. The frrst result characterizes the equilibrium prices. We show that on the 
equilibrium path, the prices are (weakly) decreasing over time. As fmns accumulate investment in cost 
reduction, their marginal cost of production falls and this is passed on to consumers in the form of 
lower prices. 
Proposition 2. The industry equilibrium price path (P¡, ...Pd satisfies PI '?:. PI+¡ lor dI t =1,2,..,T-1. 
Proot To see that equilibrlum prlces are non-increasing, suppose to the contrary that Pt < Pt+1 for 
sorne t < T. There are two possibilities: 
(i) No exit occurs at the end of period t; 
(ii) Exit occurs at the end of period t. 
Consider case (i). The measure of frrms existing in the industry is at least as large in perlod 
(t+1) as in period 1. Under assumption (A3), for each fmn i which is active in periods t and t+1, 2;(i) 
:::;;21+1(i), so that Cq(q,2;(i)) '?:.Cq(q,2;+I(i)) for all q '?:.o. As Pt <}J¡+1' it fo11ows from (2) that CItO) :::;;CIt+,(i) 
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¡1" . 
for every fmni active in the market. This implies that industry outputs Q ::; ~l whieh violates 
condition (a) of industry equilibrium (as D(p) is strietIy decreasing). 
Consider case (ii) and let i be the index of a fmn whieh exits at the end of perlad t. 
Obviously, :xt(i) = O. Also, [Pt'1(i) - C('1(i),~(i»] ~O for otherwise, it would gain by exiting one perlad 
earlier (if t = 1, then it would not have entered). This also implies '1(i) > O. Now, suppose this fmn 
stays on till perlad (t+1) making no further investment. As Pt+l > Pt, it can make profit at least as large 
as rn..1'1(i) - C('1(i),~(i)] > [Pt'1(i) - C('1(i)~(i»] ~Oin perlad (t+l). Its net discounted sum ofprofit 
till periad t is exaetIy zero and it can make strietIy positive profit in perlad (t+l), so eondition (e) of 
industry equilibrlum is violated, a eontradietion. II 
Next, we show that the equilibrlum prlee in every perlad líes below Pm(O), the minimum 
average eost for a new entrant. Note that Pm(O) is the unique equilibrlum prlee in a statie model with 
free entry (the so-called "long run" equilibrlum in textbooks). Let Qm(O) denote the (unique) minimum 
efficient scale for a new entrant, i.e. Pm(O) = [C(Qm(O),O)/Qm(O)]. 
Proposition 3. PI ::;Pn,(O) andPI <PnlO) lor all t > 1. 
Proof. If the equilibrlum prlce vector p is such that Pt > Pm(O) for sorne t, then ~t,t) > Owhieh 
contradiets condition (e) of industry equilibrlum. IfPI =Pm(O) for any t > 1, then all prlees before 
perlad t must also be equal to Pm(O) (under proposition 2). In that case, using assumption (A6), we can 
check that ~1,2) ~ [Pm(O)Qm(O)(1+8) - C(Qm(O),O) - y(E) - &:(Qm(O),E)] > Ofor E small enough, 
a contradietion to eondition (e) of the defmition of equilibrlum. II 
Our next result states that the process ofeost reduction through investment by initial entrants 
in an industry is sueh that no entry oceurs after perlad 1. The equilibrium path eould allow room for 
entry only if industry output expands over time whieh would require striet deerease in prlees. The 
latter, however, irnplies that late entrants eould always make greater intertemporal profit by entering 
earlier. As the model is fully deterministic, fmns have perfeet foresight and all fmns ex ante have 
equal chanee of entering the industry in perlad 1, all possibilities for profitable late entry are 
eliminated &pansion of industry output and prlce reduction over time takes place only as a 
consequence ofoutward shifts in the supply curves of ineumbent fmns. In our model, the lack of late 
entry eo-exists with mature ineumbent fmns earning strietly positive eurrent profit (net of fixed and 
investment eosts) - often supposed by regulatory agencies to be indicative of the existenee of anti­
eornpetitive barriers to entry. 
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Proposition 4. In the industry equilibrium path, no finn enters qfier periad 1 that is, n(l. 't) =Olar 1 

>1. 

Proot: Suppose noto Let 't > 1be the frrst period in which entry occurs after period 1. In particular, 

n('t,'t +k) > °for some k ¿ O. 

First, we show that PI =PI.! for all t ~ 't. If this were not true, then (given Proposition 2) PI 
< Pt.¡ for some t ~ 't, which (since prices are non-increasing over time) implies that PI > Pt. Suppose 
finn i E S('t,'t + k) follows output and investment path (<lt(i), ~(i», t = 't,..,'t+k. Defme an altemative 
output-investment path (~tCi), ~(i», t 1,..,k+1, for a frrm entering in period 1 and exiting in period 
(k+1) by Cq(~,(i),O) = PI' (t(i) = qT+,.¡(i) for t =2,...k+1, ~(i) = Xe+t.,(i), for t = 1,..k+1. As we have 
stated earlier, p¡ > CiO,O) so that ~¡(O) > O. As PI > p, and Pt ¿ PT+I.¡ for t =2,...k+1, we have: 
f\p,'t,'t + k) = [PAt(i) - C(qtCi),O) - y(X¡{i)] + 4.+!, ..t+k8·t[Pt<lt(i) - C(<lt(i),2t(i» - y(~(i»] 
< [P!~¡(i) - C(~l(i),O) - y(,,¡(i)] + 42... k+18·1[Pt(t(i) - C(t(i), ~(i» - y(~(i»] 
~ n:P,1,k+1) 
As f\p,'t,'t+k) = 0, we have I1:p,1,k+1) > °which contradicts condition (e) of the defmition of 
industry equilibrium. 
Next, we show that exit does not occur at the end of period ('t-l). Suppose there is a frrm 1 
\\hich exits in period ('t-l); let t be its period of entry. From Proposition 3, we know that Pt < pmC0) 
(as 't> 1). As Pt = Pt-¡ for all t ~ 't, Pt < Pm(O) for all t ~ 't. Therefore, the exiting frrm must have 
stayed in the industry for at least two periods in order to break even Also, qt_¡(1) > 0, for otherwise 
it could gain by exiting one period earlier. From assumption (A6), it follows that 2;.¡(1) > O. Now, 
consider late-entrant frrmj E S('t,'t+k) and let (<!t(j), ~G», j = 't,...,'t+k, be the output-investment path 
of finn j. Again, as Pt < Pm(O), frrm j can break even only if k ¿ 1 which also implies that XeG) > ° 
(ifX¡(j) = 0, given Pt < Pm(O), frrmj can increase its intertemporal profit by entering one period later). 
Defme the following output-investment path «t, ~, t t,....,'t+k,: ~t = <!t(1), ~ = ~(1), t = t,...,'t-l; 
4 = CJ¡G), '4 =X¡(j) - E, ~ = ~(j), t = 't+l,...,'t+k, where °< E < min(XeG), 2;.¡(1». Let ~ = ~,...(I_¡) 
is. Then, 
~t,'t+k) 
¿ ~~.t+k8-t[pt(t - C(t, ~ - y(~] 
= f\p,t,'t-l) + &-tl:., ..tTk8·t[Pt<!tG) - C(CJ¡G), ~ - y(~] 
13 

> &-tLr,..t+k8-'Tpt'ltG) - C(qtG),z¡G)) - Y(x¡G))] 
(as ~t;r-l) = 0, ~ 2'; z¡G) for t 2'; 1:, ~ < XrG) and ~ = x¡G) for t > 1:) 
= &-i~1:,1:+k) = 0, 
that is, ~t,1:+k) > 0, which contradicts condition (c) ofthe defmition ofequilibrlum. To summarize, 
exit cannot occur in perlad 1:-1 and entry in perlad 1:, recause the exiting fmn can stay on and rnake 
strictly positive profits as it has accumulated experience. 
Thus, the active fmns in perlad 1: consists of 
(1) all fmns which entered in perlad 1 and stayed on till perlad 1:-1, 
ando (2) a strictly positive measure of new entrants in perlad 1:. 
As PI = Pt and PI > Cq(O,O), it follows that Pt > CiO,O) 2'; Cq(O,z) for all z 2'; O. Therefore, all fmns 
active in the market in perlad 1: (including new entrants) produce strictly positive output. As marginal 
cost curve is upward sloping and non-decreasing in total cumulative investment, Pt= Pt-l implies that 
the total output in perlad 1: is strictly greater than in perlad (1:-1). For market to clear in perlods 1:-1 
and 1:, it should be the case that Pt < Pt.¡' a contradiction. The proof is complete. // 
As no new fmns enter the market after perlad 1, the set of active fmns in any perlad t > 1 
is a subset of the set ofactive fmns in perlad (t-l); the difference between the two sets being the set 
offmns which exit at the end ofperlad (t-l) Le., the shake-out. However, as prlces are non-increasing 
over time, the total output is non-decreasing over time. 1bis is consistent with shake-out, as fmns 
which stay in the industry undertake greater investment than exiting fmns and as a result, their 
marginal cost curves (or, individual supply curves) shift out to the rlght. It stands to reason, therefore, 
that exiting fmns at their point of exit are typically "smaller in size" and have lower stock of 
knowledge compared to staying fmns. 
However, this need not always be the case. It is possible to imagine certain pathological 
situation where fmns mayexit with greater stock ofknowledge than contemporary staying fmns. 1bis 
can occur only if the intertemporal profit maximization problem (1) has multiple solutions, and 
moreover, the marginal return to investment, along a specific output path, is locally zero in a certain 
range ofstock ofknowledge but becomes strictly positive at greater levels ofknowledge. 1bis perverse 
possible implication ofnon-convexity can be ruled out ifwe assume that the cost functions are strictly 
convex so that there is a unique solution to the interternporal profit maximization problem or the 
minimum average cost is strictly decreasing in the stock of knowledge. The latter is true ir, for 
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example, C(q,z) is strictly decreasing in z everywhere. Let Pm(z) be the minirmun average cost for a 
frrm with accumulated stock z ~ Oof knowledge and 'lm(z) the corresponding (unique) minimum 
efficient sca1e: 
Pm(z) = ruin {[C(q,z)/q]: q ~ O} = [C('lm(z),z)/'lm(z)] 
Pmposition 5. Suppose that at least one 01 the lollowing holds: 
(cP PI1l(z) is strictly decreasing in z on R+ 
(b) e and y are convex lunctions and at least one 01 them is strictly convex 

1ñen, iffinn i exits at the end01period1: < 1: andfinn j stays on tUl a laterperiad, that is, i E S(1,1:} 

andj E S(1,1:} where 1: < 1:: then zliJ '5,zli) and qliJ '5, q/j). 

The proof of Proposition 5 is contained in the appendix. 

W. On the Possibility of Shake-Out 
1he phenornenon of shake-out in this model is crucially linked to the way in 'Múch both the 
marginal as well the fIxed cost of frrms decrease with investment. In addition, for shake-out to occur, 
the demand curve has to be sufficientIy inelastic so that the industry output expands in a relatively 
conservative fashion. A cornpetitive equilibrium with exit is socially efficient because most of the 
investment is then concentrated in sorne frrms whose marginal cost decreases rather sharply. These 
frrms then undertake future production, while others exit the industry. Exiting fmns remain active in 
the industry in earlier periods on1y because fmns' marginal cost curve is steep when the stock of 
knowledge is small, so that it is too costly for the social planner to concentrate al1 production in a few 
fmns. 
Consider, frrst, an industry where investment on1y reduces the fIXed cost of production; the 
marginal cost curve does not depend on the stock of knowledge: 
C(q,z) = Cv(q} + F(z) 
\\bere 4'(q} > O, C/,(q} > O, C..{O) = O, F(z) > Ofor all z ~ O, F'(z) < O. Then the supply curves 
of individual fmns remain unchanged over time. IfPt > Pt+l for sorne t, then all active fmns produce 
lower output in period (t+l) than in period t; as late entry is ruled out on the equilibrium path 
(Proposition 4), the total output in period (t+l) is smaller than in period t, 'Múch is inconsistent with 
market clearing. Thus, prices are constant over time and so is the output of each frrm. This implies 
that there is no exit on the equilibrium path; if fmns did exit, the total output would falI 'Múch would 
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again violate market clearing (given constant prices over time). There is no heterogeneity in the 
industry. The market price líes strictly below Pm(O) and fmn output is initially below minimwn 
efficient scale; fmus eam negative gross profit in addition to incurring investment costo As the stock 
ofknowledge increases and F decreases, the rninimwn average cost falls belowthe constant price and 
the minimwn efficient scale falls below the constant output level; fmus eam positive profits that 
compensate negative profits and investment cost incurred in earlíer periods. 
The absence ofshake-out in the industry considered alx>ve depends critically on the faet that the 
marginal cost curve does not shift outwards as investment occurs, and thus the rninimwn efficient scale 
of fmus decreases over time. If, on the contrary~ the stock of knowledge increases the supply curve 
of fmus, then exit is líkely to occur~ especially (but not necessarily) if the optimal scale of fmus 
expands over time. In faet, we can give a fairly simple condition on the demand and cost functions 
which is sz(ficient to ensure that shake-out occurs on the equilibriwn path. Recall that Pm(z) and <tn(z) 
are, respectively, the rninimwn average cost and rninimum efficient scale when the stock ofknowledge 
IS Z. 
Proposition 6: If 
[D(Pn,(z))/qn,(z)] < [D(Pn,(O))/Pn,(O)] for alI z > O, (4) 
then exit must occur in some period 1: < T. 
Proof: To see this~ observe that if no exit occurs prior to period T, then the measure of fmus active 
in the industry is cOnstant over time. Let us denote this measure by n. AH fmus produce identical 
output q¡ in period 1. As PI :::;; Pm(O), q¡ :::;; <tn(0) so that 
n = D(p¡)/q¡ 2:: D(pm(O»/<tn(O) (5) 
However, Pr 2:: Pm(Z¡(i» for all active fmus i. Note that Zr = inf{Z¡(i): i E 8(1,1)} > Ofor if Zr = O, 
then Pr 2:: Pm(Z¡(i» for all i would imply that Pr 2:: Pm(O) which contradicts Proposition 1. Then, Pr 2:: 
piZr). This implies that q-¡{i) 2:: <tn(Zr) for all active fmus i. Thus, 
n :::;; !XPr)/<tn(Zr) :::;; D(pm(Zr))/<tn(Zr) (6) 
(5) and (6) together contradict (4) 11. 
One can think of [<tn(z)lD(pm(z»] as a measure ofthe size of a competitive fmn relative to 
the industry size, when the finn operates at its rninimwn efficient scale. Ifthe rninimwn efficient scale 
<Jm(z) increases rapidly with Z, relative to the increase in industry demand at price equal to rninimwn 
average cosí, then there is less and less room for fmus; though the industry size expands, the optirnal 
16 

fmn size expands faster. We present below a numerical example of an industry where investment 
reduces the marginal cost curve sharply and shake out occurs in every period. This example also 
illustrates the features of the equilibrium path as characterized in the previous section. 
&ample 110: T = 3, D(p) = 100 - p, C(q,z) = e<tz + 10, y(x) = O.5XZ, 5= 0.5. 
Equilibrium prices: 
PI =Pm(O) = 8.64403, P2 = 5.l6861, P3 2.75447 
Measure of active fmns in period 1: 42.3558 
Measure of active fmns in period 2: 19.6378 
Measure of active fmns in period 3: 17.1709 
Output-investment path followed by fmns: 
ql(i) = CJm(O) = 2.15687 for all i E SI' 
For i e S(1,I), x¡(i) = O. 
For i e S(1,2), xl(i) = 2.5843, Ch(i) = 4.22691, x2(i) = O. 
For i e S(I,3), xl(i) = 3.27292, Ch(i) = 4.91553, x2(i) = 1.37724, Cb(i) = 5.66338, x3(i) = O. 
Finns which stay for three periods invest in both period 1and 2. Shake-out offmns occurs at the end 
of both period 1 and period 2. The biggest shake-out occurs at the end of period 1. AH fmns earn 
exactly zero profit in period 1, gross ofinvestment costo In period 2, the profit offmns which exit at 
the end of that period is strictly positive and just compensates (aH appropriately discounted) the 
investment cost made in period 1. As for fmns which stay for all three periods, they eam strictly 
positive gross profit in both periods 2 and 3 (even while exit occurs!), prices are strictly greater than 
their mínimum average cost in these periods and their output is greater than the mínimum efficient 
scale; net of investrnent cost, they earn negative profit in period 2 which is compensated by the profit 
in period 3. Exiting fmns make much less investment than staying fmns (if at aH) and their marginal 
cost curve is far to the left ofthe marginal cost curve for mature staying fmns (smaller efficient scale). 
v. Sorne Oher Possibilities 
In this section, we present sorne numerical examples which highlight certain interesting 
features that may be observed in industry equilibriurn. 
100n examples 1, 2 and 3, all magnitudes are numerical approximations obtained by solving nonlinear 
equations defming the equilibrium conditions using Mathematica. 
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Example 2: T =3, D(p) = [lO/p], C(q,z) = eq-kz + 1, )'(x) =0.5x2, 0=0.9. 

Here, k :?! O is a parameter that captures the "innovational opportunities" in the industry. As k 

increases, the marginal effectiveness ofcurrent investment in reducing future total as well as marginal 

costs of production increases. For this industry, there is no exit on the equilibriwn path. AH fmns 

produce identical output qt and make identical investment ~ in each periodo Let n denote the measure 

of fmns active in the industry. Observe that demand is unit elastic evel]'\\here. 

At k = 1, the equilibriwn is given by: 

PI = 3.51727,1'2 = 1.56248, P3 1.208191, q¡ = 1.25769, <b = 2.83115, ~ = 3.66136, Xl = 2.38487, 

x2 = 1.08737, n = 2.26059. 

At k = 1.5, the equilibriwn is given by: 

PI = 3.42012,1'2 = 1.10245, P3 = 0.81471, ql = 1.22968, <b = 3.81481, ~ 5.16214, XI = 2.47818, 

X2 = 1.09986, n = 2.37776. 

The interesting feature that is illustrated by this example is that an increase in innovational 

opportunities in the industry (the effectiveness 01investment in cost reduction) mo/ leai 10 a decline 

in industry concentration (n increases). This contrasts vvith both, the general "Schwnpeterian" notion 

that higher innovational opportunities are associated vvith more concentrated industries, and the 

theoretica1 prediction in strategic static R&D models (see, for example, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) 

and Dasgupta (1986». 

Another prediction ofthe latter c1ass ofmodels is that higher research interuity (expenditure 
on R&D as a ratio of total revenue) is associated vvith greater concentration. In the context of our 
dynamic model we may define "research intensity" as: 
R = [(Xl + Ox,J/(Plql + ~<b + ~~)] 
For k = 1, R =0.280572, while for k = 1.5, R =0.304287. As noted aboye, an increase in k also leads 
to a decrease in concentration. Therefore, this example demonstrates that, contrary to the received 
doctrine, higher research interuity mo/ be associated with lower industry concentration. 
Example 3: T = 3, D(p) = [1O/¡Y], C(q,z) = eq-z + 1, )'(x) =(l/2)x2, 0=0.9 
This industry is identical to that considered in example 2 (k 1), except for the demand function 
which is uniformly more elastic than that in example 2. The industry equilibriwn is again one in which 
no exit occurs and the output~investment decisions (<1, ~ are identical across all fmns in each periodo 
As before, n denotes the measure of active finns. The industry equilibriwn is given by: 
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PI = 2.82063, P2 = 1.63276, P3 = 1.4011, ql = 1.03696, 'h = 3.09465, Cb = 4.20262, Xl = 2.60437, X2 
= 1.26099, n = 1.21211. 
Comparing with example 2 where demand is less elastic, we observe that an increase in demand 
elasticity mo/ lea:J to an incmase in concentra/ion (n = 2.26 approx. in the previous example for the 
case k = 1). 
VL Conclusion. 
We have characterized the dynamic equilibrium path ofa competitive industry with free entry 
and exit, \\bere atomistic fmns undertake investment over time in order to reduce their future 
production costs by increasing their fmn-specific stock ofknowledge. Cost reduction is deterministic 
and there are no inter-fmn spill-overs. The instantaneous marginal cost ftrnction is upward sloping and 
the average cost curve is U-shaped; investment reduces the marginal as weH as average cost curves 
over time. However, the associated dynamic scale economies are eventuaHy bounded so that a 
competitive industry equilibrium exists and is socially optimal. Equilibrium prices are (weakly) 
decreasing over time. Firms invest in cost reduction and eam negative net profit when they are young. 
In later periods, they face prices above their mínimum average cost, produce beyond their mínimum 
efficient scale and eam strictly positive net profit. The industry equilibrium path allows for no new 
entry after the initial time periodo Though all fmns are ex ante identical with perfect foresight and the 
modeI is fully deterministic, sorne fmns mayexit before others (shake-out). Exit mayoccur even while 
incumbent fmns earn strictIy positive current profits. Exiting fmns have relatively "small size" 
compared to incumbents; as the industry matures, concentration and the average size of incumbent 
fmns increase. Heterogeneity in behaviourand size offmns emerges endogenously through differences 
in their length of stay in the industry and in the absence of any random shocks. 
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A:wendix 
Oudine of the proof of Pmposition 1: We frrst give the outlines of a direct proof which is based on 
Jovanovic (1982) and virtually identica1 to that contained in Petrakis, Rasmusen and Roy (1994). 
First, consider the social planner's problem. Suppose the planner wishes to produce sorne 
vector of total output (Y1:,....Yt+J using frrms which enter in period t and exit in period (t+k). The 
number(measure) ofsuch frrms nand their optimal path (q¡{i), ~(i)), t ='t,...'t+k, must solve the social 
cost minimization problem 
't+k n 
Min í: 8·1: íC(CIt(i), z¡(i)) + y(~(i))]di (PI) 
t='t O 
subject to: 
Yt::;; 	 l(i)di (*.1) 
O 
t-l 

z¡(i) = L)(i), t > 't, z¡(i) = O. 

j='t 

(q¡{i), ~(i) 2: Oand integrable. 
Let ~t+k(yv ••••,Yt+J be the value of this minimization problem. Under our assumptions, particularly 
(A8)~ there exists a solution to tbis minimization problem (for example, using Theorem 6.1 in Aumann 
and Perles (1965». As we have a continuum offrrms, a direct application ofthe Lyapunov-Richter 
theorem (see L1.3 in l\1asColell (1985» shows that ~'t+k is a convex function. Taking variations 
around the optimal solution, it can be established that ~t+k is differentiable and that the partial 
derivative ~,t+J¿Yt= f.1t where f.1t is the optimal value ofthe dual variable correspondingto constraint 
(*.1). Further, the frrst order conditions imply that: 
f.1t = Cq(q¡{i), z¡(i», if CIt(i) > O, 	 (*.2) 
't+k 
r(~(i») + í: fj.l Cz(q¡(i), ~(i» = O, if ~(i) > O (*.3) 
j=t 
Dnder assumption (A4), (*.1) implies that the marginal social cost ofproduction ~,t+J¿Yt is bounded 
below by h > O. Let YI('t;t') denote the total output produced in period t by frrms who enter in period 
't and exit in period 1'; Rr,r(Yt('t,1'),...,Yl't,1'») the minimum social cost of producing a total output 

vector (Yi't,1'),...,Yr('t,1') by using such frrms. Note that R(O,O,..O) = O. 

Now, rewrite the social planner's intertemporal net surplus maximization problem as: 
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T Qt 
max 2JY-l [Jp(x)dx] - ~iylt,1:'),...,yi't,1:'» (P2) 
t=1 o 1:::;'t'51:'g' 
subject to: 
with respect to ylr,1:') ~ o, 1 :::; t:::; 1:' :::; T. 
As ~/Oyt ~h > Oand P(Q) ~O as Q~~ there exists a fmite solution to the social planner's 
problem As the maximand is strictly concave, there is a unique solution in total output and Qt > Ofor 
t = 1,2,...T. From the frrst order conditions of this maximization we have: 
(*.4) 
Set Pt = P(Q). If t :::; t :::; 1:' and ylt,'t') > O, then, Pt = J.lt, the dual variable corresponding to constraint 
(*.1) in the social cost minimization problem for output vector (Ylt,1:'),...,yit,1:'». From standard 
duality results, it follows that for each frrm i that enters in period t and exits in period 1:', (xli),q(i», 
t = t,...1:', maximizes intertemporal profit ~,..t8-t[Ptqt - C(q,zJ - y(xJ] and that this maximum is 
exact1y equal to zero. Thus, each frrm maximizes profit, gets zero net intertemporal profit and markets 
c1ear every period at prices {Pt}. It can also be ShO\V11 that if no frrm enters in period t and exits in 
period 1:', then Pt:::; lÍIny.kJ(~./OyJ where the partial derivative is evaluated at output vectors with zero 
output in all periods and output y in period t. These together can be used to show that no frrm can 
earn strictly positive intertemporal profit at prices {Pt}. Thus, the social planner's solution can be 
implemented as an industry equilibrium with prices {Pt}. 
Next, consider any industry equilibrium If n(t,1:') > O and (Yv ...,yt) is the total output 
produced by frrms in SCt,1:'), then the total social cost of producing (Yv...,Yt) is minimized by 
(q(i),xtCi)}, t = t,..,1:', i E S(t,1:'}. Ifthis is not true, then there is sorne other way ofproducing this total 
output vector where the total intertemporal cost across all firms would be lower; however, in the 
altemative solution, at prices {PI}' the total intertemporal revenue ofaH frrms together in the industry 
would still be the same, viz. 4t,..t8-1Wt. This implies at least one frrm can earn strictly positive 
intertemporal profit at prices {Pt}, contradicting the defmition of industry equilibrium Using the frrst 
order conditions of profit maximization it can be shmvn that Pt is equal to the optimal value of the 
dual variable in the social cost minimization problem (P2) corresponding to (y"...,Yt). Now, 
considering (P2) which is a convex problem, it can be checked that the frrst order (equality and 
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inequality) conditions of maximization are indeed satisfied by the industry equilibrium allocation 

Thus, every industry equilibrium path maximizes social welfare. As the social planner's problem has 

a tm.ique solution in terrns of total industry output, industry equilibrium is tm.ique in pricesJI 

AIteroative proof: Hopenhayn (1990) contams a proof of existence and social optimality of industry 

equilibrium in a very general stochastic modeL Under assumption (A8), we can restrict without 10ss 

of generality the output produced by a fmn in any period to lie in [O,K]. As the total investment in 

any period cannot exceed maximum total intertemporal revenue and the prices can be, without 10ss 

of generality, restricted to líe in [h,pJ, we can construct a modified model with compact aggregate 

technology (technology of fmn consists of feasible vectors of outputs, investments and their 

intertemporal cost) and compact state space (state =stock ofknowledge). Further, as marginal cost of 

production is always bounded below by h > Oand P(Q) ~Oas Q~OCI, the net social surplus goes to ­
00 (in the modified model) iftotal industry output is infmitely large (C(O,z) > O). These are sufficient 

to ensure alI the assumptions made in that papero Therefore, there exists an industry equilibrium and 

every such equilibrium path is socially optimal. It can be checked that the modifications made on the 

action and state spaces do not matter for industry equilibrium as well as social pIanner's problem 

PIDoí oí Pm¡x>sition 5: 

It is sufficient to show that z¡(i) S z¡0). Suppose, to the contrary, that z¡(i) > z¡0). From defmition of 

equilibrimn, 

~l;t)= 41,.:c8·1[PtC}¡(i) - C(C}¡(i),z¡{i» - )'(~(i») = O (7) 

4t...•8·1[P¡C}¡0) - C(q¡0),210» - )'(>;0)] s O (8) 

There are two possibilities: (i) >;0) = O, for alI t = 't, ...... ,T, and (ii) >;0) > O for some t ~ 't. 

Frrst, consider case (i). Here 210) = z¡0) for t = 't, .. T. Note that as fmn i exits in perlod 't even though 

z¡(i) > Z¡(i), it must be true that 

Pr+l S Pm(z¡(i» S Pm(z¡G» (9) 
for otherwise fmn i could make strict1y positive profit by staying one period more. 
On the other hand, as fmn j stays on till period 't', 
Pt' ~ Pm(Z¡O) (10) 
as ZrG) = z¡G). Since prices are decreasing over time, (9) and (10) imply 
Pt = Pm(z¡G» = Pm(z¡(i» for t = 't+1,....,T (11) 
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SUPJX>se condition (a) ofthe proJX>sition holds so that Pm(z) is strictly decreasing in z. Then, Pm(Zr(i)) 
< Pm(ZrG)) =Pt+l, which contradicts (11). Now, consider the situation \\!bere condition (b) of the 
proJX>sition holds so that C and yare convex and at least one of them is strictly convex.. Then, there 
is a unique solution to the intertemporal profit maximization problem for a fnm which enters in perlod 
1 and exists in t'. Observe from (10) that fnm j earns exactly zero net profit from perlod 't+ 1 till t'. 
lt is easy to check that the price-investment path (qt,xJ, t=1,..:t' \\!bere'1 =qtCi), t= 1,..'t, X¡ = x¡(i), 
t=1, ... 't-l, X¡ =x¡G), t = 't,...t', '1 = '1G) for t = 't+l, .... t' yields non-negative intertemJX>ral profit and 
hence, by defmition of equilibriurn, must yield exactly zero intertemporal profit. Thus (qt,xJ, t=1,...'t' 
is another profit maximizing solution for a fnm which stays from perlod 1 till perlod 't' which is 
/distinct from ('1G),X¡0)), t=1,...'t , a contradiction. 

Next, consider case (ii). Let t* = min{Q:r: x¡O)>O}. Choose e such that O< e < min{x¡.O), Zr(i)-ZrO)}. 

Consider the output-investment path (qt,x¡A), t = l,....;!',: qt =qtCi), t = 1,..., 't; x¡A =x¡(i), t = 1,...,'t­
1; x¡A = X¡O), t * t* and 't ~ t ~ t'; x¡.A = x¡.0) - E; '1A= (10), t = 't+l, ... ,t'. Check that, under our 

supposition and by construction, z,.A ¿ z¡0) for all t =1,...,t'. Then, 

I1:p,1,'t/) ¿ ~1,..\,a·l[Pt'1A - C('1A,z¡A) - ')I(x¡A)] 

= ~l ...t.¡a·1 {ptqtCi) - C(qtCi),z¡(i)) - ')I(x¡(i))} 

+ S'.l{Ptqt(i) - C(qii),Zr(i)) - ')I(xt)} + [~+l,..t,a·I{PtqtO) - C('10),z¡A) - ')I(xt)}] 

=I1:p,1,'t) - S'.I')I(xt) + [~I ...\,a·l{Pt(10) - C(qtO),zt) - ')I(x¡A)}] 

> -S'- I')I(~O)) + [~+l,.. \,a·I{PtqtO) - C('1G),z¡0)) - ')I(x¡0))}] 

as I1:p,I,'t) = O, z¡A ¿z¡0) for all t = 't+l, ...... ,t', x¡A = x¡0) for t *t*, 't ~t ~t', x¡.A < x¡.(j) and ')1(.) 

is strictly increasing. Lastly, we claim that 

-&- 1')l(~0)) + [~+I,.. t,8-I{Pt(10) - C('10),z¡0)) - ')I(x¡0))}] ¿ O, 
which, in turn, implies that I1:p,1,t') > O, contradicting the defmition of equilibrlum. To prove 
this 1ast claim note that if 
_Bt.l')l(xij)) + [~I,..\,a-l{Pt(10) - C('1G),z¡G)) - ')I(x¡G))}] < O 
then fnm j would earn zero intertemporal net profit only if 
~1,..t-la·l[pt(10) - C(qtO),z¡O)) - ')I(x¡0))] + S'.I{PAtO) - C(qtO),ZrO))} > O 
which would imply I1:p,1,'t) > O, a contradiction to the defmition of equilibrlum. The proof is now 
complete. // 
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